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Abstract Contact tracing is widely considered as an effective procedure in the fight against epidemic
diseases. However, one of the challenges for technology based contact tracing is the high number of
false positives, questioning its trust-worthiness and efficiency amongst the wider population for mass
adoption. To this end, this paper proposes a novel, yet practical smartphone based contact tracing ap-
proach, employing WiFi and acoustic sound for relative distance estimate, in addition to the ambient air
pressure and magnetic field environment matching. We present a model combining 6 smartphone sen-
sors, prioritising some of them when certain conditions are met. We empirically verified our approach
in various realistic environments to demonstrate an achievement of up to 95% fewer false positives, and
62% more accurate than Bluetooth-only system. To the best of our knowledge, this paper was one of the
first work to propose a combination of smartphone sensors for contact tracing.
1 Introduction
During any viral outbreak, people who have been in close contact with a contagious victim, are at risk of
being infected themselves. Therefore, being able to detect such ‘contacts’ early, correctly, and effectively,
is critical to manage and suppress the disease. In the past outbreaks (e.g. SARS, Ebola, Swine flu, etc.),
contact tracing has proven to be one of the most vital instruments for public health experts. However, as
modern viruses (e.g. Covid-19) have evolved to become far deadlier and more infectious, conventional
contact tracing approaches are urgently in need to be revamped by modern technology.
In the past decade, the continual proliferation of smartphones has changed the consumers’ behaviour.
Globally, more than 3.5 billion people own a smartphone, and in the UK alone, more than 94% of
adults have one1. The smartphone may now be considered as an indispensable necessity to serve most
people’s daily routines, from essential communications (e.g. family and friend chatting, e-mail and text
messaging), to information seeking (e.g. news reading, web surfing, route navigation), to entertainment
purposes (e.g. music listening, photo taking, game playing), to health management (e.g. fitness tracking).
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Coupling with the fact that smartphones are powerful mini-computers equipped with a variety of sensors,
this may well be the leverage for technology based contact tracing that we have been searching for.
Recently, Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology has been viewed as the future prospect for au-
tomated contact tracing, thanks to its low power consumption and its relatively short communicating
distance. However, from the application viewpoint, BLE bears two major issues (see Figure 1). Visibility
wise, two smartphones may still be reached at up to 20 metres indoors and 30 metres outdoors, because
of the wireless signal multi-path. Distance wise, it is hard to determine when two smartphones are 2
metres or 7 metres apart, based on the BLE received signal strength (RSS) which varies strongly (much
more indoors) because of its frequency hopping technique (to be discussed in Section 3.4.2).
Fig. 1 The two problems of
BLE based contact tracing
system. Firstly, two smart-
phones may still be visible
at 30 metres apart outdoors.
Secondly, it is hard to tell
the difference between 2 to 6
metres as the signal strength
standard deviation (demon-
strated by the shading areas)
is noticeably high.
To this end, this paper proposes a contact tracing system based on non-location non-intrusive smart-
phones sensors (no GPS or Cellular). Our approach combines 6 such sensors, namely the barometer,
Bluetooth, magnetometer, microphone, proximity, and WiFi, in one uniform model to detect contacts of
nearby phones. We present extensive empirical experiments to assess the feasibility and performance of
such system.
1.1 The contributions of this paper
Overall, the paper makes the following novel contributions.
• We propose a new concept of multi-smartphone-sensor system for contact tracing.
• We assess the feasibility of individual sensor with respect to contact tracing.
• We analyse the performance of the proposed system in three real world test beds.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper was one of the first work to propose a combination of
smartphone sensors for contact tracing, and the first one to assess the feasibility and the performance of
such approach.
The remaining of the paper is organised into six sections. Section 2 explains the concept of contact
tracing, and its significance. So that, Section 3 will build on, to introduce the idea of contact tracing with
multiple smartphone sensors. Then, Section 4 details the empirical experiments. Section 5 overviews
other related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes our work and outlines future research.
Epidemic Contact Tracing with Smartphone Sensors 3
2 What is contact tracing, and why is it essential ?
This section introduces the idea behind contact tracing and its roles in fighting epidemic diseases.
2.1 What is contact tracing ?
In essence, contact tracing in an epidemic is the process of identifying all potential victims, who have
been in ‘close’ contact with an infected person, and iteratively tracing the victims’ subsequent contacts
in turn.
However, being in close proximity with a contagious individual does not strictly guarantee in getting
the virus, as there are other factors such as the person’s health condition, the protective equipment (e.g.
facial mask) being used, the duration of exposure, the viral load, and many more. The overall hypothesis,
adopted by the World Health Organisation (WHO), is that a ‘contact’ is registered when two persons,
one of whom is positively tested for Covid-19, are within 1 metre of each other, for at least 15 minutes2.
2.2 Why we need contact tracing ?
Most viral infection diseases (e.g. Covid-19, SARS, Swine-flu etc.) share the common trait of being
contagious during the incubation period (i.e. the time elapsed between being exposed to the virus, and
when the first symptoms are shown) which may last for weeks without any apparent signs, during which
the infectious patients unknowingly spread the virus to other victims. Therefore, it is essential to pro-
actively quarantine all potential patients who have been in prolonged contact with the confirmed virus
host.
Contact tracing plays three critical roles in the fight against an epidemic. The first role is early treat-
ment, that is, helping exposed patients to seek timely medical treatments, hence boosting successful
recovery chance. The second role is transmission control, that is, informing potential victims to self-
isolate, hence stopping the chain of onward transmission. The third role is epidemiology study, that is,
gaining more insights (e.g. infectious origins, region, route, gender, etc.) of the epidemic, enabling a
better strategy to fight the disease in the long term.
2.3 Three forms of contact tracing
Conventionally, there are three mainstream forms of contact tracing.
• Interviews are perhaps the oldest, but are still widely used in present days, where sick patients are
requested to recall as many past contacts as they can [10]. Such interviews may be completed in per-
son, via a form in the post, or on the internet. Nevertheless, human memory may prove too imprecise
for such critical task, not to mention that such interviews are time-consuming and struggle to reach
the wider population.
• Narrowcasting aims at a small-scale, concentrated part of the population (e.g. a town, a building),
where the health authorities broadcast an announcement (e.g. on local radio, newspapers, bulletin
2 https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200326-sitrep-66-covid-19.pdf - last accessed
in 5/2020
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boards, etc.) asking past visitors to carry out viral tests, and informing others to avoid such areas. This
approach allows the officials to quickly control an epidemic hotspot. However, since narrowcasting
was meant for targeting a concentrated demographic region, it struggles to stay effective when the
epidemic spreads across different regions at large-scale.
• Real-time detection addresses the issues of both approaches above, by recording the disease contact
between citizens and managing the epidemic’s progress at it happens. Such detection has mostly been
attempted via ambient technology such as facial recognition (via Camera CCTV), signal tracking (via
the phone’s cellular signal), and location monitoring (via GPS data). The common deterrent for all of
these technologies is being intrusive, which may lead to the reluctance to comply and adopt by the
citizens.
In the next section, we will introduce our approach using smartphone sensors that improves on the
above real-time detection approach.
3 Contact tracing with smartphones sensors
Having instigated the general concept of contact tracing, we may now introduce our approach in smart-
phone sensors based contact tracing. In doing so, we will outline the idea, process, assumptions, and
challenge facing our approach.
3.1 The smartphone based contact tracing model
In principle, our approach fits in the ‘real-time detection’ category, as detailed above. The complete
process involves three steps (see Figure 2).
• Registration. All participants download and start the app on their smartphones. It will register with
the central server, then generate a unique, temporary ID representing the phone, which will be con-
stantly refreshed after some period of time. The rationale for not using a permanent ID is to make it
challenging for snoopers to identify the participants.
• Contact detection. The app detects nearby phones running the same app, and records such contacts
locally on the phone. Both phones will exchange their temporary, current IDs. The rationale for main-
taining the contact list locally on each phone, and not centrally on a server is to avoid constant data
transmission, preventing potential future data breach, and allowing the non-infectious participants to
remain anonymous.
• Infection report. There are two models for infection report, namely the centralised model, and the
decentralised model.
In the centralised model, when a participant is diagnosed positive, his/her app reports the news to a
central server, and releasing the locally stored contact list so far. It is clear that such infectious patients
must reveal their identity to the server at this stage. The server subsequently informs all contacts from
the infected user’s list.
In the decentralised model, the diagnosed participant reports only his/her positive status to the server.
S/he still needs to reveal the identity at this point. The server then updates the anonymised public list
of infected users, which all participants should frequently check to verify their own status.
The benefit of the centralised setting is that the server’s owner (e.g. government or health entities) may
have a good overview picture of the epidemic’s state, and all infected users may remain anonymous
amongst other users (except to the server, and in the rare event of a participant being in contact with
just a single user, who is later diagnosed positive). In the opposite, the benefit of the decentralised
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setting is that an infected user needs not expose his/her entire contact list to the server, giving the
participants more control of their own data.
Fig. 2 The general steps of our proposed smartphone based contact tracing procedure.
It is worth noting that we will focus mostly on detecting a contact between two nearby smartphones
(i.e. Step 2 in Figure 2). As such, other important properties such as secured protocol to exchange infor-
mation, third party trusted server, user privacy, etc. are beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2 Our assumptions
In order for smartphones based contact tracing to be effective and reliable, the following assumptions are
made:
• Substantial number of participants. In common with any other technologies, the success of this
approach relies first and foremost to the willingness of the wider population to engage. The first pre-
requisite is most citizens download the app to their smartphones. This assumption could be satisfied
as many countries start to raise their citizen’s awareness of the disease’s seriousness. It may soon be
the pre-condition to relax lock-downs and allow people to better protect themselves.
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• Carrying smartphones. As this approach registers the human contact via the smartphones, it is vital
that the devices are present along with the users when such contact happens. This assumption is mostly
satisfied as most (if not all) smartphone-owners carry it with them whenever they are outdoors.
• Accurate feedback. When a user is confirmed positive, s/he must inform the app. Subsequently,
ordinary users must not falsify such result. This assumption could be satisfied by official confirmation
from the medical test results.
It goes without saying that the above assumptions would be made easier, should the proposed technol-
ogy is shown to be effective with few false positives, and thus gaining trust amongst the users, in which
this paper aims to address.
3.3 Detecting a contact between two smartphones
Correctly detecting a contact between two nearby smartphones is the key mechanism for this approach.
We emphasise that the contact is detected in the proximity based relative position (i.e. whether the phones
are close or not?), and not the absolute coordination of the phones, which may be too sensitive to privacy
issues. The detection happens in real-time, and only a binary (yes/no) decision, along with the nearby
phones’ temporary ID (as explained in Section 3.1) are recorded locally on the phone.
There are two approaches to register such contacts with smartphone sensors (see Figure 3).
• Shared environment comparison. When two phones are nearby, their respective sensor measures of
the current environment should be similar.
• Appearance sensing. Some sensors have the ability to tell the existence of the same sensor type in
other nearby phones.
Fig. 3 The two approaches
for contact tracing with smart-
phone sensors. Two nearby
phones can either sense their
appearance and work out the
relative distance; or compare
the ambient environment they
are sharing.
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3.4 Assessing the feasibility of employing smartphone sensors
Currently, there are about 14 sensors in modern smartphones, with different functionalities. Table 1
compares some of their well-documented properties which are useful for contact tracing, namely the
permission, power usage, and sampling rate.
• Sensor permission. Permission wise, each sensor has different permission levels, based on how An-
droid deems their privacy threat. In short, there are three relevant types of Android sensor permission
for our purpose.
– No permission. No permission is needed to declare anywhere within the app or during run-time.
Sensors in this group can silently access the sensors as they wish, which includes the accelerometer,
gyroscope, magnetometer, ambient light, and proximity.
– Normal permission. These sensors pose little risk to the user’s privacy. As such, they only need to
be declared in the manifest file, and Android will ask the user just once during installation. Once
agreed, the user has no way to refuse access in future runs.
– Dangerous permission. These sensors access high privacy user data (e.g. contact information,
location data) or may affect the operation of other apps. For this group of sensors, the app must
display a pop-up window explicitly asking the user for permission to access such information,
when the app is first launched. Even after accepted, the user has total control to revoke such per-
mission in future runs.
Generally speaking, for the contact tracing purpose, there is a trade-off between usability and privacy.
Ideally, we would prefer sensors in the ‘no permission’ or ‘normal permission’ groups as they deliver
seamless user experience (e.g. the app works in a simple click without convoluted pop-up messages).
Nevertheless, the user should be made clear that such sensors (e.g. Bluetooth, WiFi) have the potential
to infer their locations.
It is worth noting that Android do not simply associate each sensor to a permission type, that is, one
sensor may need several permissions, and one permission type may be shared amongst different sen-
sors. For example, when an app needs Bluetooth access, it must specify BLUETOOTH permission (for
Bluetooth communications), and BLUETOOTH ADMIN permission (to modify Bluetooth settings) in
the ‘Normal permission’ group; as well as the ACCESS FINE LOCATION permission (to initiate a
scan) in the ‘Dangerous permission’ group, because Android consider that nearby Bluetooth devices
information including the signal strength may be used to indirectly infer the user location.
• Power consumption. This metric reports the overall energy consumed by the app. In the context
of contact tracing, this is an important factor to consider, since it prolongs the battery life between
charging cycles, thus allowing more opportunities to detect potential disease contacts, as well as
allowing the user to continue with other routines on the phone. An interesting correlation we spotted
is that most no permission and normal permission sensors consume little power (see Table 1).
• Sampling rate. This metric is the sensor’s frequency in providing the latest measure. High sampling
rate sensors are desirable to discover the smallest changes in the environment. Generally speaking,
motion related sensors (i.e. accelerometer, gyroscope) have higher frequency than others to detect the
quick changes in phone motions. At the other end of the spectrum are Bluetooth, GPS, and Cellular,
which will keep scanning and reporting the results as they become available, until the process is
interrupted.
When it comes to picking which sensors to use, we impose a strong criterion that any selected sensor
must not directly reveal the smartphone’s position, for our sole purpose of proximity tracking, and to
avoid potential information misuse. This rules out GPS (which directly yields the longitude and latitude),
and Cellular (whose cell tower location database is publicly available3). The ambient light sensor which
3 https://opencellid.org - last access in 5/2020.
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Table 1 Summary of the relevant properties of 14 common sensors in most smartphones, sorted in alphabetical order. The
data are surveyed from the LG G7 ThinQ phone.
Sensor Measure Sampling Power Permission Notes
unit rate (max) usage type
Accelerometer m/s2 500 Hz low none reporting the changing rate of the phone’s velocity.
Ambient light lx 4 Hz low none reporting the magnitude of the surrounding light.
Barometer hPa 120 Hz low none reporting the surrounding atmosphere’s pressure.
Bluetooth dBm various* medium dangerous exchanging information with nearby Bluetooth-
enabled devices.
Camera image-
form
60 Hz medium dangerous generating an image of the surroundings.
Cellular dBm various* medium dangerous exchanging information with nearby phone tow-
ers.
Fingerprint image-
form
0.5 Hz low normal generating an image of the human finger.
GPS s, m various* high dangerous reporting the satellite signals, clock timestamp,
and status.
Gyroscope rad/s 500 Hz low none reporting the changing rate of the phone’s rota-
tional motion.
Magnetometer µT 200 Hz low none reporting the magnitude of the surrounding mag-
netic field.
Microphone dB 48 kHz medium dangerous reporting the magnitude and the raw surrounding
acoustic noise.
NFC N/A 1 Hz low normal exchanging information with nearby RFID tags
within 10 cm.
Proximity cm 4 Hz low none reporting the distance to the nearest object within
10 cm. Some proximity sensors only report a bi-
nary near/far result.
WiFi dBm 0.03 Hz high dangerous exchanging information with nearby WiFi-enabled
devices.
∗ The phone will continue scanning for nearby Bluetooth devices, GPS satellites and Cellular towers, updating the results
as they come in, until the process is interrupted.
measures the lighting intensity, is an interesting source of information. Yet, its readings are too volatile
under different phone’s angles. On the same note, the camera, fingerprint, NFC, and time-of-flight’s
usage were rather specific, and do not appear to be useful for our contact tracing purpose at this stage.
Last but not least, as mentioned in the previous section, only the nearby phones’ IDs are stored locally
on the smartphones, and not the detailed sensor data.
3.4.1 Magnetometer for ambient magnetic field comparison
Magnetism exists everywhere on Earth, which is caused by the movements of molten metal at the Earth’s
core. This natural magnetic field is strongly perturbed by ferrous metal from most building’s materials.
Therefore, small indoor areas within the building may report different magnetic signatures, which is an
opportunity for matching smartphones contact.
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The magnetometer measures the ambient magnetic field strength around the phone in 3-dimensional
space. However, as the sensor is fixed within the phone body, its coordinates align with the phone’s body
frame. As such, the orientation of the phone varies the magnetometer reading, even in the same spot.
This challenge may be addressed by ignoring the direction of the magnetic field vector, and computing
the total scalar magnitude as follows.
f ield strength=
√
m2x +m2y +m2z (1)
where mx, my and mz in (µT ) are the magnetic field strength along the x, y and z axis respectively.
3.4.2 Bluetooth for proximity detection
On the smartphones, Bluetooth technology, with its latest iteration called Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE),
was intended to connect the phone to small peripherals (e.g. headphone, gamepad, etc.) in short distance
(typically no more than 10 metres, and ideally within 2 to 3 metres), which is a great fit for close contact
detection.
The detection process using BLE works as follows. First and foremost, one phone must act in the
‘Central’ role, and the other phone plays the ‘Peripheral’ role. The peripheral phone will constantly
sending out unsolicited messages (including its name, MAC address, etc.) on the 40 BLE channels to
inform its existence. The central phone, at any time of preference, will initiate a scan to look for those
peripheral phones. Secondly, both phones may establish a BLE connection to exchange information.
Ideally, the smartphones will alternate between these two roles to avoid the situation where everyone is
listening while no-one is broadcasting, and vice-versa.
As a BLE scan will also reveal the received signal strength (RSS), which roughly indicates how far
away the nearby peripheral phones are, we may estimate the distance using the well-known inverse
square law of Physics, that is, the signal intensity is inversely proportional to the square of the distance
from a signal transmitter [3].
d = 10(
Power−BLE RSS
10∗n ) (2)
where d is the estimated distance, Power is the RSS measured at 1 metre, n is the signal propagation con-
stant (e.g. n= 2 for free space path-loss), BLE RSS is the RSS received by the central phone. Although
there are other distance models, without knowing how the BLE signal propagates (especially challenging
indoors), we opted for this simple form of free path loss model.
Nevertheless, there are two challenges with BLE. Firstly, BLE wireless signal does easily penetrate
walls and furniture, which contributes to the false positive contact detection (i.e. two neighbours sepa-
rated by a thick wall may be registered as a contact). Secondly, the correlation between the RSS and the
distance is not strictly linear, because of the signal attenuation (i.e. without an unobstructed line-of-sight
between the two phones, the signal waves are strengthened or weakened as they travel in different direc-
tions in the air), and the BLE frequency hopping technique (i.e. the phone frequently switches between
the BLE channels to avoid signal collision, which inadvertently impacts the receiving signal at the other
end). We will assess these problems in more details in Section 4.
3.4.3 WiFi for distance measuring
On the smartphones, WiFi technology was originally intended to connect the phone to the Access Points
(APs) for internet access. Recently, the WiFi Direct peer-to-peer protocol enables two WiFi-enabled
devices to communicate directly without an AP, over much longer distance (up to 50 metres indoors)
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than Bluetooth, in which the smartphones will negotiate directly between themselves to automatically
assign the central and peripheral role.
From the contact detection’s viewpoint, WiFi technology may be employed for environment compar-
ison, appearance sensing, as well as distance measuring purposes.
• For environment comparison. The observation is that most modern buildings and public venues have
plenty of WiFi APs to provide internet access to residents and customers. As such, two smartphones
with a similar set of observed APs are potentially nearby.
• For appearance sensing and distance measuring. This is performed in a similar fashion as with
BLE.
However, there are five major challenges for employing WiFi. Firstly, since Android 9, all apps may
only initiate a scan at most 4 times every 2 minutes (about once every 30 seconds)4, whilst there is no
scanning restriction for Bluetooth5. Secondly, the current implementation of WiFi Direct on Android
does not expose the RSS of the peer devices, which means the phone needs to be set up as a WiFi hotspot
for its RSS to be harvested via the usual WiFi scan. Thirdly, the glaring weakness of WiFi technology
is its long broadcasting distance of up to 50 metres. As such, smartphones on different floors, or even
separate buildings may still see each others, or observe the same set of WiFi APs, which invalidates the
environment comparison approach. Fourthly, WiFi consumes much higher battery than BLE and other
sensors. Lastly, WiFi signals do suffer from the same signal multi-path problem as BLE.
Taking into account these concerns, WiFi should only be employed to complement BLE. In particular,
it should only be called into action when a potential contact has been confirmed by BLE. Given the WiFi
RSS is considerably more stable (i.e. no frequency hopping as in BLE), its distance conversion may be
more accurately represented (to be empirically assessed in Section 4).
3.4.4 Microphone for proximity detection
Sound is generated by the vibrations of air particles, which are then picked up by the human ear and
the smartphone’s microphone. For contact detection, sound may be leveraged for both the appearance
sensing and the distance measuring purposes as follows (although it is possible to encode information
within those sounds, yet, for our contact tracing purpose, we only need to detect the appearance and the
rough distance measure).
For appearance sensing, one smartphone will play the peripheral role by emitting a chirp via its built-
in loud speaker. The other phones which act in the central role will pick up those sounds by their built-in
microphone, and response with their own chirps to make contact, which indicates that they are in close
proximity.
For distance measuring, there are two options. The first one is based on the concept of time difference
of arrival. The second one is based on sound amplitude.
• Time difference of arrival (TDoA). With this approach, the distance between the two phones is
inferred by timing the moment the chirp was sent by one phone, until it is received by the other end. If
the clock of both phones are perfectly synchronised, the distance is simply calculated as distance =
speed o f sound ∗ elapsed time, with speed of sound is a constant (e.g. 343 m/s at 23 ◦C room
temperature) [11].
4 https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/wifi-scan - last access in 5/2020
5 Strictly speaking, since Android 8, the startScan() method does impose four predefined scanning configurations, where
the fastest SCAN MODE LOW LATENCY option only scans for about 300 ms. However, it is still possible (even on the
latest Android 10) to call the deprecated startLeScan()/stopLeScan() methods introduced since Android 5 to fully control
the scanning cycle.
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The rationale of this approach is that acoustic signal travels at a much slower velocity (i.e. 343 m/s),
compared to WiFi and Bluetooth signals which travel at the speed of light (i.e. 300,000 km/s). There-
fore, it is more feasible to time and compute such distance.
However, there are several challenges. Firstly, it is unlikely various smartphones would share the same
clock timing. Secondly, all Android sound packages (i.e. SoundPool, AudioTrack and OpenSL ES)
have considerably non-deterministic latency (i.e. there are unpredictable delay from the moment the
audio play command was issued, until the actual sound was sent out by the built-in speaker), in the
region of [180 ms to 300 ms]. Given that sound travels at 343 m/s, an average of 200 ms error in
TDoA estimation will lead to more than 70 metres error in ranging estimation, which is simply not
usable for our purpose.
• Sound amplitude. This approach relies on the same concept as in BLE and WiFi RSS ranging, that
is, using sound amplitude as distance indicator. The central phone plays a chirp. As this chirp travels
in the air, it loses pressure for which the receiving phone may use to work out the distance to the
central phone.
The final task is designing a chirp signal to be received reliably within short distance by other nearby
smartphones, for which there are three criteria to consider.
• Frequency. The frequency (in Hz) is the speed of vibration which determines the sound pitch (e.g.
female voice is perceived to have higher pitch than male one). Distance wise, low frequency sound
travels further than high frequency one, as there is less energy being lost in the process. As such, we
would prefer high frequency chirp for short distance contact detection. Nevertheless, high frequency
chirp tends to attenuate more heavily than low frequency one, because of higher viscosity caused
by many peaks pressuring against the air [4]. The major constraint is that, although our test phones
are capable of recording very high frequency acoustic sound, streamlined smartphone microphones
may be limited to lower frequencies in the human audible range (i.e. 20 Hz to 20 kHz), which was
primarily what they were designed for. As such, our chirp signal should be within this range.
• Amplitude. The amplitude (in dB) is the size of the vibration which determines the loudness of the
chirp. A high amplitude means louder sound, which in turns, translates to longer travelling distance.
For contact detection, we would prefer low amplitude sound for quiet operation as well as limiting
the distance to within the short contagion range.
• Duration. The duration (in ms) is the length of the vibration. For contact detection, the chirp duration
should be short, as multiple chirps may be sent simultaneously by other nearby phones, and potentially
confuse the receiving ends.
Taking all of these constraints into consideration, an ideal chirp for contact tracing purpose should
have a frequency within 2 kHz to 6 kHz range (as most acoustic sounds start to attenuate greatly above
8 kHz [8]), with an amplitude of about 20 dB (still within the recording range of all smartphone’s mi-
crophones, yet is perceived as just a small whisper for the human ear), and a 50 ms duration (the ideal
length to avoid collision with other chirps) [5]. Lastly, each smartphone should use a different frequency
when communicating to better differentiate with other nearby phones6.
There are two advantages of sound base approach. Firstly, while radio waves propagate seamlessly
through space, sound waves require a material medium (e.g. water, air) to convey from one place to an-
other, which does not easily penetrate thick walls, furniture. Secondly, we may manipulate the frequency
and loudness properties of the a chirp, which indirectly control the travelling distance, whereas although
theoretically possible to do the same with BLE, there is no Android API to modify the BLE sensor’s
sensitivity at the time of writing. Hence, sound is a great fit for contact tracing.
6 Although it is possible to construct a new chirp on the fly with new properties to quickly adjust to the real-time environ-
ment, we reckon this process would add unnecessary complexity and power usage to the system. Hence, we leave this for
future investigations.
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Nevertheless, there are three challenges for employing sound. Firstly, it does suffer from the same
multi-path issue as in BLE and WiFi, in which the acoustic signals reach the receiving microphone
in different paths, due to reverberation. Secondly, the sound propagation speed does vary according to
different temperatures and humidity (this issue may be negligible in real practice, as the distance between
the phones is rather short for our purpose). Lastly, while BLE and WiFi encode their unique sender ID
within the signal, we need to design such handshaking process from scratch for sound. Our solution is
leveraging BLE signal to make contact between the two smartphones first, before transmitting the chirp.
3.4.5 Barometer for air comparison
As most viral diseases are airborne, having the ability to detect if two persons are breathing the same
air is profoundly valuable. Regrettably, all sensors discussed so far inherit the same weakness from
the wireless signal property, that is, electromagnetic and sound wave can penetrate walls. As such, two
persons fully segregated by a thick, concrete wall may still be detected by BLE, WiFi, or sound signal,
which result in a false positive being registered.
The barometer which measures the ambient air pressure around the phone, may offer a solution for
this challenge. The observation is that, the readings are varied by the air weight in the atmosphere, caused
by different altitudes (e.g. on different building floors), or by the winds (e.g. a closed indoor space has
different measures from an open outdoor one).
Nevertheless, if the phone is kept in a tight pocket, handbag, etc., the air measures are potentially
different, although the two persons are in the same place. This challenge may be addressed with the help
of the proximity sensor below.
3.4.6 Proximity sensor for open space detection
The proximity sensor measures the distance to the nearest object facing the phone screen. It is intended
to detect the side of the human face to switch off the screen while answering a call. This sensor may help
the challenge facing the barometer by detecting whether the phone is left in tight space or in the open.
3.5 Fusion of sensors information
Having studied the individual role of each sensor, we may now present our strategy to combine the above
six sensors together. The system prioritises the appearance sensing of other nearby phones first, then
moving on to measure the relative distance between them, and finally comparing the shared environment
to reduce the number of false positives (see Figure 4 and Table 2). The detailed steps are as follows.
Appearance sensing
Step 1: The app periodically scans for nearby smartphones using the BLE signal. The ratio-
nale for using BLE as the primary sensor for appearance sensing, although other sensors (i.e.
WiFi, microphone) are capable of the same function, is two-folds. Broadcasting distance wise,
WiFi’s range would be too long for consideration (with visibility of up to 50 metres away);
acoustic sound, despite capable of adjusting its range, may not be reliable in noisy environ-
ment; whereas BLE offers the most compromised option for this matter. Power consumption
wise, BLE consumes the least amount of energy amongst these sensors. This step is repeated
until a smartphone is discovered.
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Fig. 4 The flowchart of our contact tracing process which involves different smartphone sensors at each stage. At the end of
each of the three main stages, an output regarding the phone’s visibility, the relative distance estimate, and the environment
difference are produced respectively.
Table 2 Overview of the role of the smartphones sensors employed by our system.
Sensor Appearance sensing Distance measuring Environment comparison
Barometer* N/A N/A Shared air
Bluetooth Coarse-grained N/A N/A
Magnetometer N/A N/A Ambient magnetism
Microphone Fine-grained Fine-grained N/A
WiFi N/A Medium-grained N/A
* The proximity sensor is used as a trigger for barometer.
Step 2: When a nearby phone is found by BLE, its range could be anywhere within 30 metres,
including being on the other side of a thick wall or furniture. As such, this step attempts to fur-
ther reduce these false positives with sound sensing. Firstly, the app does a preliminary check
of the ambient noise. Since our chirps have an amplitude of around 20 dB, if the background
noise is above this threshold, the system skips to Step 3, otherwise it performs a chirp scanning
to see if the other phone can be heard (sound does not penetrate walls as easily as WiFi and
BLE, hence there is a chance the phones are truly close).
Distance measuring
Step 3: If the environment is too noisy, the system computes the WiFi based distance between
the phones (although WiFi has a theoretical longer range than BLE, it does not use frequency
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hopping, hence resulting in much stable RSS). Otherwise, if the nearby phone can be reached
by the chirp, the system computes the sound based distance, then proceeds to compute the
WiFi based distance as well. In the end, those two distances are averaged for a better distance
estimate.
Environment comparison
Step 4: If both smartphones are in open space (as verified by the proximity sensor), the system
compares their ambient air pressure, to assess whether the respective phone owners are breath-
ing the same air (which is critical for airborne diseases). Otherwise, the system just compares
the ambient magnetic field around the phones.
The above processes may be viewed as in an on-line setting, where sensor measures arrive in real-
time, and the system should decide on 3 output metrics, that are (in decreasing priority order), whether
the two smartphones are close, what is the relative distance between them, and if they are sharing the
same environment. Ideally, for a contact between the two phones to be registered, the app should detect
that they are close (via BLE and/or sound), and their estimated distance is less than 1 metre according
to WHO’s guidance on infection (via WiFi and/or sound), and their shared environment is similar (via
barometer and/or magnetometer). The final decision for each metric will be made over a 15 minute
window (which is the duration to be infected according to the WHO’s guidance), where the appearance
can be a simple majority vote (e.g. if there are 10 samples in this period, in which over 50% of them
indicate a match, then the final decision is that they are close), the distance estimate and the environment
sharing are an average of individual measures over this period window.
3.6 Challenges
Although the aforementioned sensors are undoubtedly useful for contact tracing, it is worth remembering
that all of them were primarily designed for other purposes in mind. As such, the following challenges
should be taken into account.
• Heterogeneous sensors. Smartphones sensors come in different shapes and forms according to their
makers, which may impact their sensitivities to the environment (e.g. some phones may receive a
strong WiFi or BLE signal from far away thanks to a bigger antenna, whereas others need to be much
closer). This challenge specifically impacts the environment observation approach, as one smartphone
may view the world around differently from another phone.
• Noisy measures. Smartphones sensors are miniaturised devices being packed tightly in a small phone
body, whose measures are particularly noisy, not to mention the interference from other sources (e.g.
the 2.4 GHz band is overcrowded with devices such as PC, laptop, microwave, radio, etc.). This
challenge impacts the reliability of the sensors, as a sudden electronic noise may be misclassified as
a true measure.
• Signal multi-path. In a convoluted environment, there is rarely an unobstructed line-of-sight between
the two smartphones. As such, the radio and sound waves travel in unexpected fashions in the air,
which results in various receiving signals at the other end. This challenge strongly impacts the true
distance estimate which is heavily based on the RSS. We address this concern by measuring several
signals in the same place (i.e. increasing the probability of observing the good signal), and combining
signals from different sensors. It is worth noting that as people approach closer to each other, there is
less likely an obstacle between them, which lessens the impact of this challenge.
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4 Empirical experiments
Having presented our contact tracing proposal, we will now assess its feasibility and performance in
various experiments. In doing so, we aim to address the following research questions.
• Appearance sensing wise, what is the typical indoor and outdoor detection range of BLE and sound ?
• Relative distance wise, what is the offset between the estimated sound based, and WiFi based distance
measure and the true distance ?
• Environment comparison wise, what is the feasibility of using air pressure and magnetic field ?
• Overall contact detection wise, what is the accuracy (in terms of the number of false positives) of our
approach, compared to pure BLE based system ?
4.1 Test beds
Three realistic test beds, representing both indoor and outdoor environment, were purposely selected to
examine the feasibility and performance of our approach (see Figure 5). The first test bed contains a
five-room office. The second test bed contains the communal areas of a 14-storey building. The third test
bed is an open air parking garage.
Sample wise, for each test bed, we record 80 test instances, where each instance contains a pair of
samples from two test phones at two different locations. In total, there are 240 test instances across the
3 test beds. Distance wise, 60 of these instances are within 1 metre (i.e. the contagion range advised by
WHO), another 60 of them are within 1 metre and 2 metres (i.e. the contagion range adopted by most
European countries), 40 of them are within 2 metres and 3 metres (i.e. the false positive buffer zone),
and the remaining 80 are somewhere between 3 metres and 30 metres (see Table 3).
Table 3 Overview of the distribution of test samples. More emphasis was given to samples within 3 metres as they are
within the infection range of our interest.
Distance between phones Indoor samples Outdoor samples
(0 - 1) metre 40 20
(1 - 2) metres 40 20
(2 - 3) metres 20 20
(3 - 30) metres 20 60
Ambient environment wise, the five-room office represents a typical indoor condition, with plenty
of electric appliances (e.g. laptops, PCs, cameras) operating in the background, which may impact the
wireless signal between the phones. The 14-storey building allowed our approach to be verified on dif-
ferent floor levels. The parking garage represents an ideal environment with wide open space containing
unobstructed line-of-sight between the devices for minimal signal path loss.
4.2 Test devices
Three smartphones were selected for testing, namely the LG G7 ThinQ, Samsung Galaxy S8, and Lenovo
Phab 2 Pro (from now on, they will be simply referred to as LG, Samsung, and Lenovo phones). They
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(a) The five-room office. There is plenty of electric appliances
lying around (not shown here).
(b) The ground floor of the 14-storey building. Only the
communal areas (the shaded areas) were used.
(c) The parking garage. The shaded areas are the parking lots, which were
mostly empty on the day.
Fig. 5 The floor plans of the three test beds.
were chosen to represent a variety of smartphones in the past 5 years, as well as covering different
sensors manufacturers and Android operating systems (see Table 4). The LG phone will play the role as
the central phone, whereas the Samsung and Lenovo phones will play the peripheral role.
Table 4 Overview of the 3 smartphones used to verify our approach.
Phone model Year released Android OS Sensors manufacturer
LG G7 ThinQ 2018 9.0 Invensense
Samsung Galaxy S8 2017 7.0 Bosch
Lenovo Phab 2 2016 6.0.1 Bosch
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4.3 Appearance sensing analysis
The purpose of the first experiment is assessing the visibility of BLE and sound, with varying distance
between the two smartphones and the environment settings. For each of the 240 test locations, one
smartphone constantly looks for the other during a fixed 1 minute period, keeping a record of each scan.
We used the same pair of LG, Samsung phones in this experiment for consistency.
For BLE, the result revealed three interesting trends (see Figure 6). Firstly, the further the distance
between of the two phones was, the fewer the discoverability rate was. At 20 metres indoors, the detection
number was just 16, compared to 124 of that when two phones were 1 metre apart. Secondly, the indoor
visibility was noticeably poorer than outdoors (which is understandable with almost zero line-of-sight
between the phones). Thirdly, they may still see each other at 20 metres apart indoors, and 30 metres
outdoors. The third result has a strong implication for contact tracing, as these detections are clearly not
in the contagion range, and may trigger a false positive.
Fig. 6 The scanning frequency of BLE, reported at 240 test locations. At each location, the central LG phone scans for 60
seconds and reports the result. In general, more measures were available outdoors than indoors, and at shorter distances.
For sound, the appearance characteristics were similar to that of BLE, in which the further away the
distance was, the less likely it could be heard. Yet, there was one clear distinction, that was, far fewer
test instances beyond 2 metres can be heard with our chirp than with BLE (e.g. out of 20 test instances
with more than 3 metres distance, only 8 of them could be reached with sound) (see Figure 7).
Since both BLE and sound may penetrate walls and furniture, their visibility was tested on different
floor levels, with about 3 metre ceiling height. Interestingly, we got no sound feedback beyond the first
floor, whereas BLE signal could penetrate up to the 6th floor (see Figure 8).
We do not report the scanning frequency for WiFi and sound, because of the WiFi scanning restriction
on Android (at most 4 scans every 2 minutes), and the design of our chirp broadcasting interval (to avoid
sound collision), as discussed in detail in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.
In summary, the results in this section reveal that BLE-only based systems may score plenty more
false positives due to its high visibility of up to 20 metres indoors and 30 metres outdoors. Sound,
on the other hand, with much shorter travelling range, may offer an extra layer of appearance sensing
information on top of BLE.
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Fig. 7 The hearing sensi-
tivity of sound indoors and
outdoors with respect to dif-
ferent distances between the
two smartphones. The shaded
areas represent test locations
without any BLE or sound
signal. Overall, the sensitiv-
ity decreases as the distance
increases.
Fig. 8 The visibility of BLE
and sound on 13 floor levels,
with 10 test locations per
floor. The central LG phone
was placed on the ground
floor, while the Samsung
phone keeps climbing up.
No sound contact could be
made beyond the 1st floor,
where BLE can still be heard
on the 6th floor. The shaded
areas represent test locations
without any BLE or sound
signal.
4.4 Relative distance analysis
This section assesses the feasibility and accuracy of the WiFi based and sound based distance estimate.
Since the only output we have, is just a simple number in the form of the WiFi RSS and sound
pressure, we will assess how reliable this measure is, in the most ideal condition. As such, we performed
the experiment in the open air parking garage, where the LG phone was fixed in one place, while the
Lenovo phone moved away from it in a straight line. At every one metre along the way, 10 WiFi RSS and
sound signal were taken. Theoretically, we would expect a steady decrease of such measures following
the free space path loss model, with respect to increasing distance.
For WiFi, the results revealed three surprising characteristics (see Figure 9). Firstly, even when both
phones are static, with a clear line-of-sight between them and almost no interference from the environ-
ment (i.e. the signal may still bounce off the floor, nevertheless), the WiFi RSS still varies in the same
spot. Secondly, strong signals (within 3 metres) and weak signals (beyond 20 metres) tends to be more
stable than medium signals (from 3 metres to 20 metres). A plausible explanation is that at short distance
the signal does not take long to travel, whereas by the time it travels 20 metres, it has lost most of its
energy. Medium distance is the central spot for signal attenuation. Thirdly, at the same position, BLE
RSS fluctuates significantly more than WiFi’s, due to frequency hopping.
For sound, the result revealed a remarkably consistent measure with very little variation in this ideal
outdoor setting. This ascertains its usefulness in estimating the relative distance between the smart-
phones.
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Fig. 9 Comparison of the
WiFi, BLE, and sound signal
propagation in an ideal open
air setting with a clear line-
of-sight between the two
smartphones. The sound
signals are scaled by the right
side y-axis. Acoustic sound
and WiFi signals have the
least amount of variations,
compared to BLE, at the same
location.
Having understood the baseline expectation of BLE, WiFi and sound propagation characteristic, we
may now assess their estimated distance’s accuracy with our 240 test instances, both indoors and out-
doors. For each test location, the true distance is the shortest straight line connecting the two smartphones
discounting any walls and furniture in-between, the estimated WiFi and sound based distances are ob-
tained from the free space path loss model (as discussed in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4), the result is an
average of 10 sound measures and 4 WiFi measures (the Android cap for 2 minutes scan).
The result revealed the challenging impact of signal multi-path, where both WiFi based and sound
base approaches produced high distance estimate error (see Figure 10). In particular, sound based ap-
proach achieved less than 2 metre distance error 90% of the time, whereas WiFi based approach could
only manage 6.5 metre distance error 90% chance, demonstrated by the Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CDF) plot. The confidence bound of sound based result, computed by the Kaplan-Meier estima-
tor [2], was also noticeably tighter than WiFi based one.
Fig. 10 Comparison of the
overall estimated distance
based on WiFi and sound
signal. The 95% confidence
bound of sound based result,
calculated by the Kaplan-
Meier estimator, is noticeably
tighter than WiFi one.
However, it was surprising that, when focusing on just indoor test locations within 3 metres, where
there are furniture, walls between the smartphones, WiFi based estimated distances were slightly more
accurate than sound one (see Figure 11). This result suggests that a combination of WiFi and sound may
produce a better distance estimate.
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Fig. 11 Comparison of the
indoor estimated distance
based on WiFi and sound
signal for test locations less
than 3 metres apart. WiFi
based distance estimates were
slightly more accurate than
sound one.
4.5 Environment comparison analysis
This section assesses the feasibility and accuracy of using the barometer and magnetometer to determine
whether the two smartphones are sharing the same environment, in particular, ‘breathing’ the same air,
which is critical for airborne infection.
Regarding air pressure, we assess its feasibility in close contact detection by experimenting its mea-
sure across the vertical and horizontal spaces.
Vertical space wise, we collect 10 barometer readings with the LG and Samsung phones in the 14
floor building, with about 3 metre ceiling height separating each floor. The result reveals three useful
information (see Figure 12a). Firstly, the average air pressure strictly decreases as the altitude increases.
Secondly, there was a clear measure gap of around 0.43 hPa between each floor. Thirdly, the reading
variations are particularly low (i.e. rather stable) per floor, of around 0.13 hPa.
(a) The air pressure on different floor levels exhibits a clear gap of
around 0.43 hPa. The variation per floor is low at around 0.13 hPa.
(b) The distribution of the air pressure indoors and
outdoors.
Fig. 12 The air pressure measures in different environments.
Horizontal space wise, we averaged the air pressure measures at 120 indoor test locations and 120
outdoor test locations, which reported 1,012.4 hPa and 1,012.59 hPa respectively (see Figure 12b). The
0.19 hPa average difference may provide a good indication to separate the indoor and outdoor users. Note
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that both the indoor and outdoor test environments are on pretty much the same ground level, with the
parking garage locating next to the office building. The physical separation between them are walls, doors
which may not be kept closed at all times. Therefore, a plausible explanation of such difference measure
is that the building’s exhaust ventilation system must have made an impact on the air pressure. Much
more importantly, the variation of air pressures within the same building floor, or within the parking
garage, is negligible and being lost within the sensor’s mechanical noise, which turns out to be a great
benefactor for our purpose, since smartphones within those areas are ‘breathing’ the same air space.
Regarding the magnetic field, the magnitude plot of 240 test locations across the 3 test beds revealed
two interesting observations (see Figure 13). Firstly, the magnetic variation oscillates much stronger
indoors than outdoors, with a maximum magnitude of nearly 120 µT in the office test bed, compared
to just 67 µT in the parking garage test bed. The high number of electric appliances and the building
materials may have been accounted for this variation. Secondly, the magnetic anomalies happened in
small areas (i.e. only locations within a small room will have similar high magnetic disturbance).
(a) The five-room office exhibits high magnetic anomalies at
various small areas.
(b) Some communal spaces (e.g. by the elevator) on the
ground floor of the 14-storey building contains some
magnetic disturbances.
(c) The open air parking garage have low magnetic differences. There were not many
cars around on the testing day.
Fig. 13 The magnetic heat map visualisation of the three test beds. The colour maps have been put to the same scale.
To assess the efficiency of the magnetic readings with respect to the distance between the two smart-
phones, we separate the 240 test locations into 3 categories, that are, tests within [0-1] metres, [1-2]
metres, [2-3] metres, and [3-30] metres (more emphasis was given for those under 3 metres as they are
of our particular interest), then computing the magnetic magnitude difference between the two smart-
phones in each category. The result demonstrated a much smaller Euclidean distance for close ranges,
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which implies that smartphones in increasingly long distance may observe much different magnetic
readings (see Figure 14).
Fig. 14 The Euclidean dis-
tance between the magnetic
measures of the two smart-
phones at various distances.
Close range samples have
much smaller magnetic differ-
ence than long range ones.
Ultimately, the question is, how would the air pressure and the magnetic field be employed to de-
termine if the two smartphones are in close proximity ? Based on the above empirical experiments, air
pressure wise, an empirical constant of 0.15 hPa difference threshold (which is above the sensor noise,
but is still below the air pressure separation) may be used to determine if two smartphones are in close
proximity. Magnetic field wise, an empirical constant of 20 µT difference threshold was chosen. In the
next section, we will assess how those measures affect the overall system performance.
4.6 Contact detection accuracy analysis
Having assessed each of the three processes separately, we may now present the general system accuracy
in detecting smartphones contact. The performance metrics are summarised in Table 5. For a true positive
contact to be registered, both smartphones need to be within 1 metre of each other for at least 15 minutes
(according to the WHO infection guideline). In our tests, we will slightly neglect the time duration
constraint, and will only observe 10 measures per test location.
Table 5 Performance metrics in epidemic tracking context.
Metrics Note
True positive (TP) True infection contact registered by the system
False positive (FP) Harmless non-infection contact registered by the system
True negative (TN) Harmless non-infection contact ignored by the system
False negative (FN) Actual contact but ignored by the system
Overall accuracy TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN
Overall, out of 240 test instances, when only BLE appearance sensing was employed, the number of
false positives was rather high at 180 (with most of them indoors) which results in a system accuracy
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of just 25%. These figures are unsurprising given the high visibility of BLE. By incorporating distance
measuring, the number of false positives dropped significantly to just 61, and more than doubled the sys-
tem accuracy. However, the trade-off at this point was the increasing number of false negatives, which
was unfortunately wrongly discarded by inaccurate distance estimates. Lastly, by applying the environ-
ment comparison on top, the number of false positives was further reduced to just 9, boosting the overall
system accuracy to 87.08% (see Table 6).
Table 6 Performance comparison of different system mechanics. A true positive contact means the real distance between
the smartphones is within 1 metre.
System mechanics Sensors employed FP FN TP TN Accuracy
Appearance (BLE only) 180 0 60 0 25%
Appearance, distance (BLE, WiFi, Microphone) 61 22 38 119 65.42%
Appearance, distance, environment (BLE, WiFi, Microphone, Barometer, Magnetometer) 9 22 38 171 87.08%
5 Related work
As our work is mostly dedicated for smartphone based contact tracing system, with practical application
in mind, we will only review similar approaches in the literature.
BLE based contact tracing is perhaps the most popular approach, which was first proposed by the
FluPhone project [12] (note that they also mixed in GPS coordination data). Most recently, a pure BLE
solution was implemented by BlueTrace for the Singaporean government, which senses nearby smart-
phones via BLE scanning and approximates the distance between them via the BLE RSS [1].
GPS based solution, despite its intrusive nature, has also been attempted, with the most recent work
by Raskar et al. [9] which builds GPS location trails of the registered users. Obviously, having access to
this type of detailed location coordination would make contact tracing much easier and more accurate,
should the privacy concern be properly addressed.
WiFi based solution, which features dominantly in the indoor positioning research, has become more
attractive for epidemic tracking, thanks to the increasing number of indoor and outdoor public WiFi
Access Points. Our previous work demonstrated that contact detection using pure WiFi RSS could closely
match the accuracy of GPS in the city centre, when at least 10 WiFi APs were around [6].
Magnetometer based approach was first proposed in our previous work to track passengers on the
public transports [7]. The two vital observations of this work were that the electric currents powering
the rail lines would alter the on-board magnetic field in such a way that people in different carriages
experience various non-deterministic measures; and the fact that passengers must share the same journey
between at least two consecutive stations.
6 Conclusion and further work
We have presented our novel, yet practical smartphone based contact tracing approach. Through-out the
six sections, we have thoroughly assessed the feasibility and the accuracy of our system in three realistic
indoor and outdoor test beds.
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From our empirical results, we come to the conclusion that BLE only approach would suffer from
a high number of false positives, due to its high visibility of up to 30 metres outdoors and 20 metres
indoors, as well as high RSS variation because of its frequency hopping technique. WiFi signal, despite
its long range distance, possesses much more stable RSS, and combining with sound signal would further
enhance the distance estimate. More importantly, we recognise the natural property of WiFi, and BLE
signals which may penetrate walls easily. To this end, air pressure measure provided by the barometer
and the magnetic field magnitude provided by the magnetometer were employed to determine if the users
are breathing the same air.
Ultimately, a system making vital decisions about the people’s health such as contact tracing should be
reliable and informative. Because of several number of parameters involved in the process (e.g. visibility,
distance, time), it is more helpful to attach other information into all contact registrations (i.e. a contact
estimated to be within 50 cm in more than 15 minutes should have a higher infection chance, than
one estimated to be within 2 metres), rather than wholly relying on a binary (yes/no) contact detection.
Looking further ahead, it is critical to recognise that viral infections (e.g. Covid-19, SARS) are spread
through the air. As such, contact tracing technologies should be able to make distinction between a true
contact in shared air space, or a false one segregated by thick walls, to which, this paper is hoping to
inspire future similar contact tracing approaches.
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